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Abstract
With the emergence of cloud computing services, computationally weak devices (Clients) can delegate
expensive tasks to more powerful entities (Servers). This raises the question of verifying a result at a
lower cost than that of recomputing it. This verification can be private, between the Client and the
Server, or public, when the result can be verified by any third party. We here present protocols for
the verification of matrix-vector multiplications, that are secure against malicious Servers. The obtained
algorithms are essentially optimal in the amortized model: the overhead for the Server is limited to a very
small constant factor, even in the sparse or structured matrix case; and the computational time for the
public Verifier is linear in the dimension. Our protocols combine probabilistic checks and cryptographic
operations, but minimize the latter to preserve practical efficiency. Therefore our protocols are overall
more than two orders of magnitude faster than existing ones.
1 Introduction
With the emergence of cloud computing services, computationally weak devices (Clients, such as smart
phones or tablets) can delegate expensive tasks to more powerful entities (Servers). Such heavy tasks can,
e.g., be cryptographic operations, image manipulation or statistical analysis of large data-sets. This raises
the question of verifying a result at a lower cost than that of recomputing it. This verification can be private,
between the Client and the Server, or public, when the result can be verified by any third party.
For instance within computer graphics (image compression and geometric transformation), graph theory
(studying properties of large networks), big data analysis, one deals with linear transformations of large
amount of data, often arranged in large matrices with large dimensions that are in the order of thousands
or millions in some applications. Since a linear transformation on a vector x can be expressed by a matrix-
vector multiplication (with a matrix of size m×n), a weak client can use one of the protocols in the literature
[6, 14, 4] to outsource and verify this computation in the optimal time O(m + n), i.e., linear in the input
and the output size. However as these protocols use expensive cryptographic operations, such as pairings,
the constants hidden in the asymptotic complexity are usually extremely large [13].
In this paper, we propose an alternative protocol, achieving the same optimal behavior, but which is also
practical: the overhead for the Prover is now very close to the time required to compute the matrix-vector
multiplication, thus gaining two orders of magnitude with respect to the literature. Our protocol not only
does this for dense matrices, but is also sensitive to any structure or sparsity of the linear transformation.
For this, we first remove any quadratic operation that is not a matrix-vector multiplication (that is we use
projections and rank-1 updates) and second we separate operations in the base field from cryptographic
operations so as to minimize the latter.
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More precisely, we first combine rank-one updates of [6] and the projecting idea of [4] with Freivalds’
probabilistic check [7]. Second, we use a novel strategy of vectorization. For instance, with a security
parameter s (e.g., an s = 128-bits equivalent security), exponentiations or pairings operations usually cost
about O(s3) arithmetic operations. To make the whole protocol work practical, we thus reduce its cost
from O (s3mn) to O (µ(A) + s3(m+ n4/3)), where µ(A) < 2mn is the cost of one, potentially structured,
matrix-vector multiplication. We also similarly reduce the work of the Verifier. This allows us to gain two
orders of magnitude on the Prover’s work and therefore on the overall costs of outsourcing, while preserving
and sometimes even improving the practical efficiency of the Verifier.
Thus, after some background in Section 2, our first improvement is given in a relaxed public verification
setting in Section 3 via matrix projection and probabilistic checks. Our second improvement is given in
Section 4 where the verification is bootstrapped efficiently by vectorization. We then show how to combine
all improvements in Section 5 in order to obtain a complete and provably secure protocol. Finally, we show
in Section 6 that our novel protocol indeed induces a global overhead factor lower than 3 with respect to
non verified computations. This is gaining several orders of magnitude on the Prover side with respect to
previously known protocols, while keeping the Verification step an order of magnitude faster.
2 Background and definitions
In this paper, we want to be able to prove fast that a vector is a solution to a linear system, or equivalently that
a vector is the product of another vector by a matrix. This is useful, e.g., to perform some statistical analysis
on some medical data. We distinguish the matrix, a static data, from the vectors which are potentially diverse.
In the following, Fp will denote a prime field and we consider:
• Data: matrix A ∈ Fm×np .
• Input: one or several vectors xi ∈ Fnp , for i = 1..k.
• Output: one or several vectors yi = Axi ∈ Fmp , for i = 1..k.
Then, we denote by ? an operation performed in the exponents (for instance, for u ∈ Gn and v ∈ Zn, the
operation uT ? v actually denotes
∏n
j=1 u[j]
v[j]).
Publicly Verifiable Computation. A publicly verifiable computation scheme, in the formal setting
of [11], is in fact four algorithms (KeyGen, ProbGen, Compute, Verify), where KeyGen is some (amortized)
preparation of the data, ProbGen is the preparation of the input, Compute is the work of the Prover and
Verify is the work of the Verifier. Usually the Verifier also executes KeyGen and ProbGen but in a more
general setting these can be performed by different entities (respectively called a Preparator and a Trustee).
More formally we define these algorithms as follow:
• KeyGen(1λ, f)→ (param, EKf , V Kf ): a randomized algorithm run by a Preparator, it takes as input
a security parameters 1λ and the function f to be outsourced. It outputs public parameters param
which will be used by the three remaining algorithms, an evaluation key EKf and a verification key
V Kf .
• ProbGen(x) → (σx): a randomized algorithm run by a Trustee which takes as input an element x in
the domain of the outsourced function f . It returns σx, an encoded version of the input x.
• Compute(σx, EKf )→ (σy): an algorithm run by the Prover to compute an encoded version σy of the
output y = f(x) given the encoded input σx and the evaluation key EKx.
• Verify(σy, V Kf ) → y or ⊥: given the encoded output σy and the verification key V Kf , the Verifier
runs this algorithm to determine whether y = f(x) or not. If the verification passes it returns y
otherwise it returns an error ⊥.
Completeness. A publicly verifiable computation scheme for a family of function F is considered to be
perfectly complete (or correct) if for every function belonging to F and for every input in the function domain,
an honest Prover which runs faithfully the algorithm Compute will always (with probability 1) output an
encoding σy which will pass Verify.
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Soundness. A publicly verifiable computation scheme for a family of function F is called sound when a
prover cannot convince a verifier to accept a wrong result y′ 6= y except with negligible probability. More
formally we evaluate the capability of an adversary A to deceive the verifier through a soundness experiment.
In this experiment, we assume that the adversary A accesses to the output of the algorithm KeyGen by
calling an oracle OKeyGen with inputs 1λ and the function to evaluate f . This oracle OKeyGen returns public
parameters for the protocol param, an evaluation key EKf and a verification key V Kf . Afterwards the
adversary A sends its challenge input x to an oracle OProbGen which returns σx. Finally A outputs an
encoding σy∗ 6= σy and runs the Verify algorithm on inputs σy∗ and V Kf , whether it outputs y or ⊥ the
experiment has either succeeded or failed.
Definition 1. A publicly verifiable computation scheme for a family of function F is sound if and only if for
any polynomially bounded adversary A and for any f in F the probability that A succeeds in the soundness
experiment is negligible in the security parameter.
Adversary model. The protocol in [6] (recalled for the sake of completeness in Appendix A) is secure
against a malicious Server only. That is the Client must trust both the Preparator and the Trustee. We
will stick to this model of attacker in the remaining of this paper. Otherwise some attacks can be mounted:
• Attack with a Malicious Preparator only : send A′ and a correctly associated W ′ to the Server, but
pretend that A is used. Then, all verifications do pass, but for y′ = A′x and not y = Ax.
• Attack with a Malicious Trustee only : there, a malicious assistant can provide a wrong VKx making
the verification fail even if the Server and Preparator are honest and correct.
• Attack with Malicious Server and Trustee: the Server sends any y′ and any z′ to the Trustee, who
computes VK’x[i] = e(z
′[i]; g2)/ay
′[i], that will match the verification with y′ and z′.
Public delegatability. One can also further impose that there is not interaction between the Client and
the Trustee after the Client has sent his input to the Server. Publicly verifiable protocols with this property
are said to be publicly delegatable [4]. The protocol in [6] does not achieve this property, but some variants
in [14, 4] already can.
Bilinear Pairings. The protocols we present in this paper use bilinear pairings and their security is based
on the co-CDH assumption, for the sake of completeness we recall hereafter these definitions.
Definition 2 (bilinear pairing).
Let G1, G2 and GT be three groups of prime order p, a bilinear pairing is a map e : G1 ×G2 → GT with the
following properties:
1. bilinearity: ∀a, b ∈ Fp, ∀(g1, g2) ∈ G1 ×G2, e(ga1 , gb2) = e(g1, g2)ab;
2. non-degeneracy: if g1 and g2 are generators of G1 and G2 respectively then e(g1, g2) is a generator of
GT ;
3. computability: ∀(g1, g2) ∈ G1 ×G2, there exist an efficient algorithm to compute e(g1, g2).
Definition 3 (co-CDH assumption).
Let G1, G2 and GT be three groups of prime order p, such that there exist a bilinear map e : G1×G2 → GT .
Let g1 ∈ G1, g2 ∈ G2 be generators and a, b $← Fp be chosen randomly. We say that the co-computational
Diffie-Hellman assumption (co-CDH) holds in G1, if given g1, g2, ga1 , gb2 the probability to compute gab1 is
negligible.
Related work. The work of [6] introduced the idea of performing twice the computations, once in the
classical setting and once on encrypted values. This enables the Client to only have to check consistency of
both results. The protocol is sound under the Decision Linear and co-CDH hypothesis. Then [14] extended
the part on matrix-vector multiplication to matrix-matrix while adding public delegatability. Finally, [4]
introduced the idea of projecting the random additional matrix and the extra-computations of the server,
which allows to reduce the cost of the Verify algorithm. It also decreases the size of the verification key
3
by a factor m. For an m×n dense matrix, the protocol in [6] has a constant time overhead for the Prover,
but this constant is on the order of cryptographic public-key operations like pairings. Similarly, the Verifier
has O (mn) cryptographic public-key pre-computations and O (n) of these for the public verification. These
cryptographic operations can then induce some 106 slow-down [13] and do no improve even if the initial
matrix is sparse or structured (as the rank one updates, s · tT and σ · τT , are always dense).
3 A first step towards public verifiability
Freivalds’ probabilistic verification of matrix multiplications [7] allows for private verifiability of matrix-vector
computations. This can be naturally extended in the random oracle model via Fiat-Shamir heuristic [5]. This
however forces the vectors to be multiplied to be known in advance (the full details are given in Appendix B),
whereas our goal is instead to obtain public verifiability with an unbounded number of vector inputs. As
an upstart, we thus first present an improvement if the public verification model is slightly relaxed: in this
Section, we allow the Trustee to perform some operations after the computations of the Server. We will
see in next sections how to remove the need for the Trustee’s intervention. For this, we combine Freivalds
projection (to check that Axi = yi, one can first precompute w
T = uTA and check that wTxi = u
T yi) with
Fiore & Gennaro’s protocol, in order to improve the running time of both the Trustee and the Client: we let
the Prover compute its projection in the group. That way most of the pairings computations of the Trustee
and Client are transformed to classical operations: the improvement is from O (n) cryptographic operations
to O (n) classical operations and a single cryptographic one. Further, the projection can be performed
beforehand, during the precomputation phase. That way the preparation requires only one matrix-vector
for the Freivalds projection and the dense part is reduced to a single vector. The cryptographic operations
can still be delayed till the last check on pairings. This is shown in Figure 1.
• Preparator: secret random u ∈ Fmp , t ∈ Fnp , then ωT = gu
TA+tT
1 ∈ Gn1 .
• Preparator to Prover: A ∈ Fm×np , ω ∈ Gn1
• Preparator to Trustee: u, t in a secure channel.
• Verifier to Prover: xi ∈ Fnp
• Prover to Verifier: yi ∈ Fmp , ζi ∈ G1 such that yi = Axi and ζi = ωT ? xi.
• Verifier to Trustee: xi, yi
• Trustee to Verifier: hi = (uT ·yi) ∈ Fp and di = (tT ·xi) ∈ Fp, then send ηi = e(g1; g2)hi+di ∈ GT .
• Verifier public verification: e(ζi; g2) ?== ηi in GT .
Figure 1: Interactive protocol for Sparse-matrix vector multiplication verification under the co-CDH.
Theorem 4. The protocol of Figure 1 is perfectly complete and sound under the co-Computational Diffie-
Hellman assumption.
The proof of Theorem 4 is given in Appendix C.
4 Verifying the dot-products by bootstrapping and vectorization
To obtain public verifiability and public delegatability, the Client should perform both dot-products, uT · y
and tT · x (from now on, for the sake of simplicity, we drop the indices on x and y). But as u and t must
remain secret, they will be encrypted beforehand. To speed-up the Client computation, the idea is then
to let the Server perform the encrypted dot-products and to allow the Client to verify them mostly with
classical operations.
For this trade-off, we use vectorization. That is, for the vectors u and y, we form another representation
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as
√
m×√m matrices:
U =

u1 . . . u√m
u1+
√
m . . . u2
√
m
. . . . . . . . .
u1+m−√m . . . um
 and Y =

y1 . . . y1+m−√m
y2 . . . y2+m−√m
. . . . . . . . .
y√m . . . ym
 .
Then uT ·y = Trace(UY ). Computing with this representation is in general slower than with the direct dot-
product, O
(√
m
3
)
instead of O (m). As shown next, this can be circumvented with well-chosen left-hand
sides and at least mitigated, with unbalanced dimensions.
4.1 dot-product with rank 1 left-hand side
The first case is if u is of rank 1, that is if in matrix form, u can be represented by a rank one update,
U = µ · ηT for µ, η ∈ F
√
m
p . Then both representations require roughly the same number of operations to
perform a dot-product since then:
Trace(µ · ηT · Y ) = ηT · Y · µ (1)
Therefore, we let the Prover compute zT = gη
T
1 ?Y , where z[i] = g
∑
η[j]Y [j,i]
1 , and then the Verifier can check
this value via Freivalds with a random vector v: gη
T
1 ? (Y · v) ?== zT ? v. The point is that the Verifier needs
now O (m) operations to compute (Y · v), but these are just classical operations over the field. Then its
remaining operations are cryptographic but there is only O (√m) of these. Finally, the Verifier concludes
the computation of the dotproduct, still with cryptographic operations, but once again with only O (√m)
of them. Indeed, the dot product d = uT y = Trace(UY ) = Trace(µ · ηT · Y ) = ηT · Y · µ is checked by
e(gd1 ; g2) = e(g1; g2)
d =
∏√m
i=1 e(z[i]; g
µ[i]
2 ) and the latter is e(g1; g2)
∑∑
µ[i]η[j]Y [j,i] = e(g1; g2)
ηT ·Y ·µ.
In practice, operations in a group can be slightly faster than pairings. Moreover d√me2 can be quite far
off m. Therefore it might be interesting to use a non square vectorization b1×b2, as long as b1b2 ≥ m and
b1 + b2 = Θ (
√
m) (and 0 padding if needed). Then we have U ∈ Fb1×b2p , µ ∈ Fb1p , η ∈ Fb2p , Y ∈ Fb2×b1p and
z ∈ Gb12 . The obtained protocol can compute e(g1; g2)u
T ·y with O (√m) cryptographic operations on the
Verifier side and is given in Figure 2.
Lemma 5. The protocol of Figure 2 for publicly delegation of a size m external group dot-product verification
with rank-1 left hand side is sound, perfectly complete and requires the following number of operations where
b1b2 ≥ m and b1 + b2 = Θ (
√
m):
• Preparation: O (b1+b2) in Gi;
• Prover: O (m) in Gi;
• Verifier: O (m) in Fp, O (b1+b2) in Gi and O (b1) pairings.
Proof. Correctness is ensured by Equation (1). Soundness is given by Freivalds check. Complexity is as
given in the Lemma: indeed, for the Verifier, we have: for Y · v: O (b2b1) = O (m) classic operations; for
gη
T
1 ?(Y v): O (b2) cryptographic (group) operations; for zT ?v: O (b1) cryptographic (group) operations; and
for
b1∏
i=1
e(z[i]; g
µ[i]
2 ): O (b1) cryptographic (pairings) operations. Then the preparation requires to compute
gη1 ∈ Gb21 and gµ2 ∈ Gb11 , while the Prover needs to compute gη
T
1 ? Y for Y ∈ Fb2×b1p and b1b2 = O (m).
4.2 Rectangular general dot-product
Now if u is not given by a rank 1 update, one can still verify a dot-product with only O (√m) pairings
operations but as the price of slightly more group operations as given in Figure 3.
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• KeyGen(1λ, µ, η): given the security parameter 1λ and vectors µ ∈ Fb2p and η ∈ Fb1p such that
u = µ · ηt, it selects two cyclic groups G1 and G2 of prime order p that admit a bilinear pairing
e : G1×G2 → GT and generators g1, g2 and gT of the three groups. Finally it outputs params =
{b1, b2, p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2, gT } and EKf = (gη
T
1 ) and V Kf = (g
µ
2 ).
• ProbGen(y): from y ∈ Fmp it builds Y ∈ Fb1×b2p and outputs σx = Y .
• Compute(σx, EKf ): compute zT = gη
T
1 ? Y and outputs σy = (z
T ).
• Verify(σy, V Kf ): it starts by sampling randomly a vector v ∈ Fb2p then it checks whether zT ? v
is equal to gη
T
1 ? (Y v) or not. If the test passes it returns
∏
e(z[i]; g
µ[i]
2 ) and if it fails it returns
⊥.
Figure 2: Publicly delegatable protocol for the dot-product in an external group with a rank-1 left hand
side.
• KeyGen(1λ, u): given the security parameter 1λ and vector u ∈ Fmp , it selects two cyclic groups
G1 and G2 of prime order p that admit a bilinear pairing e : G1×G2 → GT and generators g1, g2
and gT of the three groups and also integers b1, b2 such that m = b1b2 and it outputs params =
{b1, b2, p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2, gT }. Then it samples a random w ∈ Fb1p , creates U ∈ Fb1×b2p from
u and finally it outputs and EKf = (g
U
1 ) and V Kf = (g
wT ·U
1 , g
ωT
2 ).
• ProbGen(y): from y ∈ Fmp it builds Y ∈ Fb2×b1p and outputs σx = Y .
• Compute(σx, EKf ): compute C = gU1 ? Y and outputs σy = (C).
• Verify(σy, V Kf ): it starts by sampling randomly a vector v ∈ Fb1p then it computes z = C ?v and
checks whether
∏
e(z[i]; g
ω[i]
2 ) is equal to e(g
wT ·U
1 ? (Y v); g2) or not. If the test passes it returns
Trace(C) and if it fails it returns ⊥.
Figure 3: Publicly delegatable protocol for the external dot-product.
Lemma 6. The protocol of Figure 3 is sound, perfectly complete and requires the following number of
operations with b1b2 ≥ m:
• Preparation: O (m) in Fp and O (m) in Gi;
• Prover: O (mb1) in G1;
• Verifier: O (m) in Fp, O
(
b21+b2
)
in Gi and O (b1) pairings.
Proof. Correctness is ensured by the vectorization in Equation (1). Soundness is given by the Freivalds
check. Complexity is as given in the Lemma: indeed, for the Verifier, we have:
1. Y · v: O (b2b1) = O (m) classic operations;
2. gw
TU
1 ? (Y v): O (b2) cryptographic (group) operations;
3. z = C ? v: O (b21) cryptographic (group) operations;
4.
b1∏
i=1
e(z[i]; g
w[i]
2 ): O (b1) cryptographic (pairings) operations;
Then the preparation requires to compute wT×U . This is O (b1b2 = m) operations. Finally, the Prover needs
to compute the matrix multiplication gU1 ? Y for U ∈ Fb1×b2p and Y ∈ Fb2×b1p , in O
(
b21b2
)
= O (mb1).
Therefore, one can take b1 = O ( 3
√
m) and b2 = O
(
m2/3
)
which gives only O (m2/3) cryptographic
operations for the Verifier, and O (m4/3) cryptographic operations for the Prover. Now a dot-product can
be cut in nk chunks of size k. Then Each chunk can be checked with the protocol of Figure 3 and the final
dot-product obtained by adding the chunks. This gives the complexity of Corollary 7.
Corollary 7. There exist a protocol for the dot-product using: O (n1−a/3) cryptographic operations for the
Verifier and O (n1+a/3) cryptographic operations for the Prover, for any 0 < a < 1.
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Proof. We let k = na and use n/k times the protocol of the previous point with b1 =
3
√
k and b2 = k
2
3 .
Overall this gives n/k(k4/3) for the Prover and n/k(k2/3) for the Verifier.
5 Public delegatability via bootstrapping
To recover the public delegatability model, we use the protocol of Figure 1 but we trade back some cryp-
tographic operations using the protocol of Figure 2 to the Verifier. With an initial matrix A ∈ Fm×np we
however trade back only on the order of O (√m+√n) cryptographic operations. This gives a slower verifi-
cation in practice but interaction is not needed anymore. We present our full novel protocol for matrix vector
product in Figure 4 (with the flow of exchanges shown in Figure 7, Appendix E). Apart from Freivalds’s
• Keygen(1λ, A): given a security parameter 1λ and a matrix A ∈ Fm×np , it selects two cyclic groups
G1 and G2 of prime order p that admit a bilinear pairing e : G1 × G2 → GT . Then it selects
generators g1, g2 and gT of the three groups, and integers b1, b2, c1, c2, d1, d2 such that b1b2 = m
and c1c2 = d1d2 = n with b1 + b2 ∈ O
(
m1/2
)
, c1 + c2 ∈ O
(
n1/2
)
, d1 ∈ O
(
n1/3
)
, d2 ∈ O
(
n2/3
)
and it outputs parameters:
param = (m,n, b1, b2, c1, c2, d1, d2, p, e,G1,G2,GT , g1, g2, gT ).
Then it samples randomly µ ∈ Fb1p , η ∈ Fb2p , (ρi)2i=1 ∈ Fc1p , (τi)2i=1 ∈ Fc2p , $ ∈ Fd1p , (γ, δ) ∈ F2p and
v ∈ Fnp with v ' V ∈ Fd1×d2p .
Finally it computes U = µ·ηT ' u ∈ Fnp , T = ρ1 ·τT1 +ρ2 ·τT2 ' tT ∈ Fnp , ωT = gu
T ·A+tT+γδvT
1 ∈ Fnp
and publishes:
EKf = {A,ωT , (gτ
T
1
1 ), (g
τT2
1 ), (g
ηT
1 ), (g
δ·V
1 )}
V Kf = {(gτ
T
1
1 ), (g
τT2
1 ), (g
ρ1
2 ), (g
ρ2
2 ), (g
ηT
1 ), (g
µ
2 ), (g
δ$T ·V
1 ), (g
γ$
2 ), g
γ
2 }.
• ProbGen(x): given a vector x ∈ Fnp , output σx = x.
• Compute(σx, EKf ): given the encoded input σx and the evaluation key EKf , it computes y = Ax,
ζ = ωT ? x, sTi = g
τTi
1 ? X for i ∈ {1, 2} with x ' X ∈ Fc2×c1p , zT = gη
T
1 ? Y with y ' Y ∈ Fb2×b1
and C = gδ·V1 ? X with x ' X ∈ Fd2×d1p . Finally it outputs σy = {y, ζ, (sTi )2i=1, z, C}.
• Verify(σy, V Kf ): it starts by sampling randomly four vectors (v1, v2) ∈ Fc1p , v3 ∈ Fb1p and v4 ∈
Fd1p . Then for i = 1, 2 it checks whether sTi ? vi is equal to g
τTi
1 ? (X · v1) or not, then it computes
Di =
∏
e(si[j]; g
ρ1[j]
2 ) for both i. Then it checks whether z
T ? v3 is equal to g
ηT
1 ? (Y v3) or not,
then it computes H =
∏
e(z[i]; g
µ[i]
2 ). From there it computes ϑ = C ? v4, and it checks whether∏
e(ϑ[i]; g
γ$[i]
2 ) is equal to e(g
δ$T ·V
1 ? (Xv4); g
γ
2 ). If all the previous tests have passed it performs
a final check which is to know if e(ζ; g2) is equal to H ·D1 ·D2 ·e(Trace(C); gγ2 ) or not, if it passes
it output y, but if any of the previous check has failed it outputs ⊥.
Figure 4: Proven publicly delegatable protocol for matrix-vector product
checks and vectorization, we need to use a masking of the form uTA + tT (see Figure 1) indistinguishable
from a random distribution, but:
1. We have to add an extra component γδvT to uTA+tT so that it is possible, when proving the reduction
to co-CDH, to make up a random vector ωT = gu
TA+t where the components of uTA+ tT are canceled
out. This component cannot be revealed to the Prover nor the Verifier, otherwise its special structure
could have been taken into account by the reduction. Also this component cannot have the rank-1
update structure as its has to be a multiple of uTA+ tT . Therefore only the protocol of Figure 3 can
be used to check the dotproduct with gv
T
.
2. To be able to apply the analysis of [6, Theorem 3] while allowing fast computations with t, we use a
special form for t, namely: tT = ρ1τ
T
1 + ρ2τ
T
2 .
With these modifications we are able to prove the soundness of the protocol in Figure 4.
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Theorem 8. Let A ∈ Fm×np whose matrix-vector products costs µ(A) arithmetic operations. Protocol 4 is
sound under the co-CDH assumption, perfectly complete and its number of performed operations is bounded
as follows:
Preparation Prover Verifier
Fp µ(A)+O (m+n) µ(A) O (m+n)
Gi O (m+n) O
(
m+n4/3
) O (√m+n2/3)
Pairings 0 0 O (√m+√n)
The proof of Theorem 8 is given in Appendix E.
Remark 9. Fast matrix multiplication can be used for the computation of C in the protocol of Figure 4.
This decreases the O (n4/3) factor of the Prover to O (n(1+ω)/3) where ω is the exponent of matrix-matrix
multiplication. The currently best known exponent, given in [8], is ω ≤ 2.3728639. This immediately yields
a reduced bound for the Prover of µ(A) + O (m+ n1.12428797). This together with Corollary 7 can produce
a protocol with Prover complexity bounded by µ(A) + O (m+ n1+0.12428797a), for any 0 < a < 1, while the
Verifier complexity is O (n) classical operations and o(n) cryptographic operations.
6 Conclusion and experiments
We first recall in Table 1 the leading terms of the complexity bounds for our protocols and those of [6, 14, 4]
(that is each value x in a cell is such that the actual cost is bounded by x + o(x)). There, we denote
the base field operations by · F , the cryptographic group exponentiations or pairing operations by · G,
and the cost of a product of the matrix A ∈ Fm×np by a vector is µ(A). We see that our protocols are
Table 1: Leading terms for the time and memory complexity bounds (exchange of A, x and y excluded).
Scheme [6] [14] [4]
Mode Public verif. Public deleg. Public deleg.
Preparator (KeyGen) 2mn · F +mn · G − 2mn · F + 2mn · G
Trustee (ProbGen) 2(m+ n) · F + 2m · G mn · F + (2m+ n) · G n · G
Prover (Compute) µ(A) · F + 2mn · G µ(A) · F + 2mn · G µ(A) · F + 2mn · G
Verifier 2m · G 2m · G m · G
Extra storage O (mn) O (mn) O (mn)
Extra communications O (m) O (m) O (1)
Scheme Figure 1 Figure 4
Mode Public verif. Public deleg.
Preparator (KeyGen) (µ(A) + n) · F + n · G (µ(A) +m+ 5n) · F + 2n · G
Trustee (ProbGen) 2(m+ n+ 1) · F + 1 · G 0
Prover (Compute) µ(A) · F + 2n · G µ(A) · F + (2n4/3 +m) · G
Verifier 1 · G (2m+ 4n) · F + (6√m+ 2n2/3) · G
Extra storage O (m+ n) O (n)
Extra communications O (1) O (n2/3 +√m)
suitable to sparse or structured matrix-vector multiplication as they never require O (mn) operations but
rather µ(A). Moreover, we see that most of the Verifier’s work is now in base field operations were it was
cryptographic operations for previously known protocols. As shown in Table 2 and in Figure 5, this is very
useful in practice, even for dense matrices. For these experiments we compare with our own implementations
of the protocols of [6, 14, 4] over the PBC library1 [9] for the pairings and the FFLAS-FFPACK library2 [3]
1https://crypto.stanford.edu/pbc, version 0.5.14
2http://linbox-team.github.io/fflas-ffpack, version 2.2.2
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Table 2: Matrix-vector multiplication public verification over a 256-bit finite field with different protocols
on a i7 @3.4GHz.
1000×1000 2000×2000
[12] [6] [14] [4] Fig. 4 [6] [14] [4] Fig. 4
KeyGen 141.68s 152.62s - 154.27s 0.80s 615.81s - 612.72s 1.75s
ProbGen - 1.25s 2.28s 2.30s - 2.13s 4.98s 4.56s -
Ax = y 20.14s 0.19s 0.19s 0.19s 0.19s 0.78s 0.78s 0.78s 0.78s
Compute 188.60s 273.06s 433.88s 271.03s 2.26s 1097.96s 1715.46s 1079.71s 5.37s
Verify 2.06s 26.62s 27.56s 0.33s 0.90s 52.60s 55.79s 0.62s 1.19s
4000×4000 8000×8000
[6] [14] [4] Fig. 4 [6] [14] [4] Fig. 4
KeyGen 2433.10s - 2452.98s 4.89s 9800.42s - 9839.26s 15.64s
ProbGen 3.81s 13.29s 9.24s - 7.41s 43.44s 18.46s -
Ax = y 3.28s 3.28s 3.28s 3.28s 13.30s 13.30s 13.30s 13.30s
Compute 4360.43s 6815.40s 4329.46s 13.76s 17688.69s 27850.90s 17416.38s 37.00s
Verify 103.14s 107.99s 1.20s 1.65s 211.07s 220.69s 2.37s 2.25s
for the exact linear algebra over finite fields (C++ source files are available on request via the PC and will
be publicly posted on our web site if the paper is accepted). We used randomly generated dense matrices
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Figure 5: Protocol 4 performance.
and vectors and to optimize the costs (pairings are more expensive than exponentiations), we also chose the
following parameters for the vectorizations: b1 = d
√
m/10e; b2 = d10
√
me; c1 = d
√
n/10e; c2 = d10
√
ne;
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d1 = dn1/3/3e; d2 = d3n2/3e. We indeed chose a type 3 pairing over a Barreto-Naehrig curve [1] based on a
256-bits prime field, which should guarantee 128 bits of security. First, with Fp the 256-bits prime field3, G1
is the group of Fp-rational points E(Fp) with parameters: G1 (E) : y2 = x3 + 6, modulo p. Second, G2 is a
subgroup of a sextic twist of E defined over Fp2 denoted E′(Fp2) with parameters4: G2 (E′) : y2 = x3 + 6e,
Fp2 ∼= Fp[X]/(X2 − 2), e = a0 + a1X ∈ Fp2 . The third group GT is then a subgroup of the multiplicative
group of the field Fp12 . This curve is reasonably well-suited to our needs and is supported by the PBC
library. We used it for our own implementation of the three protocols [6, 14, 4] as well as for ours, Section 5
and Figure 7.
In the first set of timings of Table 2, we also compare the latter protocols with a compiled verifiable
version obtained via the Pepper software5 [12]. This software uses a completely different strategy, namely
that of compiling a C program into a verifiable one. We added the timings for n = 1000 as a comparison,
but the Pepper compilation thrashed on our 64 GB machine for n ≥ 2000.
In terms of Prover time, we see that our protocols are between two to three orders of magnitude faster
than existing ones (further evidence is given in Table 4, Appendix E). Moreover, overall we see that with the
new protocol, the data preparation (KeyGen) is now very close to a single non-verified computation and that
the work of the Prover can be less than three times that of a non-verified computation (note first, that in both
Table 2 and Figure 5, the “Compute” fields include the computation of y = Ax, and, second, that the Prover
overhead being asymptotically faster than the compute time, this latter overhead is rapidly amortized).
Finally, only the protocol of [4] did exhibit a verification step faster than the computation itself for size
2000×2000 whereas, as shown in Figure 5, our protocol achieves this only from size 3000×3000. However,
we see that we are competitive for larger matrices. Moreover, as shown by the asymptotics of Theorem 8,
our overall performance outperforms all previously known protocols also in practice, while keeping an order
of magnitude faster Verification time.
References
[1] Paulo S. L. M. Barreto and Michael Naehrig. Pairing-friendly elliptic curves of prime order. In Bart
Preneel and Stafford Tavares, editors, Selected Areas in Cryptography: 12th International Workshop,
SAC 2005, Kingston, ON, Canada, August 11-12, 2005, Revised Selected Papers, pages 319–331, Berlin,
Heidelberg, 2006. Springer Berlin Heidelberg. doi:10.1007/11693383_22.
[2] Guido Bertoni, Joan Daemen, Michae¨l Peeters, and Gilles Assche. Sponge-based pseudo-random num-
ber generators. In Stefan Mangard and Franc¸ois-Xavier Standaert, editors, CHES 2010, pages 33–47.
Springer, 2010. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-15031-9_3.
[3] Jean-Guillaume Dumas, Pascal Giorgi, and Cle´ment Pernet. Dense linear algebra over prime fields: the
FFLAS and FFPACK packages. ACM Transactions on Mathematical Software, 35(3):1–42, November
2008. doi:10.1145/1391989.1391992.
[4] Kaoutar Elkhiyaoui, Melek O¨nen, Monir Azraoui, and Refik Molva. Efficient techniques for publicly
verifiable delegation of computation. In Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer
and Communications Security, ASIA CCS ’16, pages 119–128, New York, NY, USA, 2016. ACM. doi:
10.1145/2897845.2897910.
[5] Amos Fiat and Adi Shamir. How to prove yourself: Practical solutions to identification and signature
problems. In A. M. Odlyzko, editor, Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO’86, volume 263 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 186–194. Springer-Verlag, 1987, 11–15 August 1986. URL: http:
//www.cs.rit.edu/~jjk8346/FiatShamir.pdf.
3
p = 57896044618658115533954196422662521694340972374557265300857239534749215487669
4
a0=52725052272451289818299123952167568817548215037303638731097808561703910178375, a1=39030262586549355304602811636399374839758981514400742761920075403736570919488
5https://github.com/pepper-project/pepper, git: fe3bf04
10
[6] Dario Fiore and Rosario Gennaro. Publicly verifiable delegation of large polynomials and ma-
trix computations, with applications. In Proceedings of the 2012 ACM Conference on Computer
and Communications Security, CCS ’12, pages 501–512, New York, NY, USA, 2012. ACM. doi:
10.1145/2382196.2382250.
[7] Ru¯sin¸sˇ Freivalds. Fast probabilistic algorithms. In J. Becˇva´rˇ, editor, Mathematical Foundations of
Computer Science 1979, volume 74 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 57–69, Olomouc,
Czechoslovakia, September 1979. Springer-Verlag. doi:10.1007/3-540-09526-8_5.
[8] Franc¸ois Le Gall. Powers of tensors and fast matrix multiplication. In Proceedings of the 39th Interna-
tional Symposium on Symbolic and Algebraic Computation, ISSAC ’14, pages 296–303, New York, NY,
USA, 2014. ACM. doi:10.1145/2608628.2608664.
[9] Ben Lynn. The pairing-based cryptography (PBC) library, 2010. URL: https://crypto.stanford.
edu/pbc.
[10] NIST. FIPS publication 202: SHA-3 standard: permutation-based hash and extendable-output functions,
August 2015. doi:10.6028/NIST.FIPS.202.
[11] Bryan Parno, Mariana Raykova, and Vinod Vaikuntanathan. How to delegate and verify in pub-
lic: verifiable computation from attribute-based encryption. In Ronald Cramer, editor, Theory of
Cryptography: 9th Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2012, Taormina, Sicily, Italy, March
19-21, 2012. Proceedings, pages 422–439, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2012. Springer Berlin Heidelberg. doi:
10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_24.
[12] Srinath T. V. Setty, Richard McPherson, Andrew J. Blumberg, and Michael Walfish. Making argument
systems for outsourced computation practical (sometimes). In 19th Annual Network and Distributed
System Security Symposium, NDSS 2012, San Diego, California, USA, February 5-8, 2012. The Internet
Society, 2012. URL: http://www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/04_3.pdf.
[13] Michael Walfish and Andrew J. Blumberg. Verifying computations without reexecuting them. Commu-
nications of the ACM, 58(2):74–84, January 2015. doi:10.1145/2641562.
[14] Yihua Zhang and Marina Blanton. Efficient secure and verifiable outsourcing of matrix multiplications.
In Sherman S.M. Chow, Jan Camenisch, Lucas C.K. Hui, and Siu Ming Yiu, editors, Information
Security, pages 158–178. Springer International Publishing, 2014. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-13257-0_
10.
A Fiore and Gennaro’s protocol
For the sake of completeness, we present here the original protocol for matrix-vector verification in [6],
but with our rank-one update view. It stems from the fact that if s, t, ρ, τ are randomly generated vectors
then the function gM [i,j], where M = s · tT + ρ · τT , is a pseudorandom function [6, Theorem 3], provided
that the Decision Linear assumption [6, Definition 3] holds (a generalization of the External Diffie-Hellman
assumption for pairings).
• KeyGen: for A ∈ Fm×np , generate 3 multiplicative groups (G1,G2,GT ) of prime order p, with g1
generating G1 (resp. g2 generating G2), and a bilinear map e : G1×G2 → GT . Generate 2(m + n)
secret random values s ∈ Fmp , t ∈ Fnp , ρ ∈ Fmp , τ ∈ Fnp . Compute W [i, j] = gαA[i,j]+s[i]t[j]+ρ[i]τ [j]1 ∈ G1,
give W to the server and publish a = e(gα1 , g2) ∈ GT .
Let x ∈ Fnp be a query vector
• ProbGen: compute VKx ∈ GmT , such that d = tT · x ∈ Fp, δ = τT · x ∈ Fp, and VKx[i] =
e(g
s[i]d+ρ[i]δ
1 ; g2) ∈ GT .
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• Compute: compute y = Ax and z = W ? x ∈ Gm1 (that is z[i] =
∏n
j=1W [i, j]
x[j]).
• Verify : check that e(z[i]; g2) = ay[i]VKx[i], for all i = 1, . . . ,m.
In this protocol, the flow of communications is as follows:
1. Preparator: secret random α ∈ Fp, s ∈ Fmp , t ∈ Fnp , ρ ∈ Fmp , τ ∈ Fnp . then W = gαA+s·t
T+ρ·τT
1
2. Preparator to Prover: A ∈ Fm×np , W ∈ Gm×n1 .
3. Preparator to Trustee: s, ρ, t, τ , in a secure channel.
4. Preparator publishes and signs a = e(g1; g2)
α ∈ GT .
5. Verifier to both Prover and Trustee: x ∈ Fnp .
6. Trustee publishes and signs VKx ∈ GmT such that : VKx = e(g1; g2)s·(t
T ·x)+ρ·(τT ·x).
7. Prover to Verifier: y ∈ Fmp , z ∈ Gm1 .
8. Verifier public verification: e(z; g2)
?
== ayVKx (component-wise in GmT ).
This protocol is sound, complete and publicly verifiable. It however uses many costly exponentiations
and pairings operations that renders it inefficient in practice: even though the Client and Trustee number
of operations is linear in the vector size, it takes still way longer time that just computing the matrix-vector
product in itself, as shown in the experiment Section 6.
In this paper, our aim was first to adapt this protocol to the sparse/structured case, and, second, to
reduce the number of cryptographic operations in order to obtain a protocol efficient in practice.
B Probabilistic verification and the random oracle model
First we recall that private verification is very fast and does not require any cryptographic routines. Then we
show that this allows to obtain a very efficient protocol in the random oracle model, but for a fixed number
of inputs.
B.1 Private verification
Without any recourse to cryptography, it is well known how to privately verify a matrix-vector multiplica-
tion. The idea is to use Freivalds test [7], on the left, provided that multiplication by the transpose matrix
is possible:
• Verifier to Prover: A, xi ∈ Fnp , for i = 1, . . . , k.
• Prover to Verifier: yi ∈ Fmp , for i = 1, . . . , k.
• Verifier verification: random u ∈ Fmp , then wT = uT · A, and finally check, for i = 1, . . . , k, that
wT · xi ?== uT · yi in Fp.
On the one hand, this protocol uses only classical arithmetic and is adaptable to sparse matrices, that is
when a matrix vector product costs µ(A) operations with µ(A) < 2mn (this is the case for instance if the
matrix is not structured but is sparse with µ(A)/2 < mn non-zero elements). Indeed, in the latter case, the
cost for the Prover is kµ(A), where the cost for the Verifier is µ(A) + 4kn.
On the other hand, the protocol has now Freivalds probability of revealing an error in any of the yi:
1− 1/p, if Fp is of cardinality p (or 1− 1/p` if u is chosen in an extension of degree ` of Fp).
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B.2 Public verification in the random oracle model
Using Fiat-Shamir heuristic [5], the privately verifiable certificate of Section B.1 can be simulated non-
interactively: uniformly sampled random values produced by the Verifier are replaced by cryptographic
hashes (to prove security in the random oracle model) of the input and of previous messages in the protocol.
Complexities are preserved, as producing cryptographically strong pseudo-random bits by a cryptographic
hash function (e.g., like the extendable output functions of the SHA-3 family defined in [2, 10]), is linear in
the size of both its input and output (with atomic operations often even faster than finite field ones):
• Preparator to Prover: A ∈ Fm×np .
• Verifier to Prover: xi ∈ Fnp , for i = 1, . . . , k.
• Prover to Verifier: yi ∈ Fmp , for i = 1, . . . , k.
• Verifier to Trustee: all the xi and yi.
• Trustee publishes and signs both u ∈ Fmp and w ∈ Fnp such that: u = Hash(A, x1, . . . , xk, y1, . . . , yk) ∈
Fmp , then wT = uT ·A ∈ Fnp .
• Verifier public verification: wT · xi ?== uT · yi in Fp.
There is absolutely no overhead for the Prover; the cost for the Trustee is a single matrix-vector product
for any k plus a cost linear in the input size; and the cost for the Verifier is O (nk). Using Fiat-Shamir
heuristic this gives a possibility for an afterwards public verification (that is after the computations), but
this not possible to test new vectors once u has been revealed.
C Proof of Theorem 4
We here give the proof of Theorem 4, page 4, recalled hereafter.
Theorem 4. The protocol of Figure 1 is perfectly complete and sound under the co-Computational Diffie-
Hellman Problem assumption.
Proof. For the correctness, we have that: ζi = g
(uTA+tT )·xi
1 = g
uT ·yi+tT ·xi
1 = g
hi
1 g
di
1 = g
hi+di
1 . Then, by
bilinearity, e(ζi; g2) = e(g1; g2)
hi+di = ηi.
For the soundness, a malicious Prover can guess the correct output values, but this happens once in the
number of elements of GT . Otherwise he could try to guess some matching hi and di, but that happens less
than one in the number of elements of Fp. Finally, the Prover could produce directly ζi. Suppose then it is
possible to pass our verification scheme for some A, x and y′ 6= y = Ax. Then without loss of generality, we
can suppose that the first coefficients of both vectors are different, y′[1] 6= y[1] (via row permutations) and
that y′[1]− y[1] = 1 (via a scaling).
Take a co-computational Diffie-Hellman problem (gc1, g
d
2), where g
cd
1 is unknown. Then denote by a =
e(gc1; g
d
2) = e(g
cd
1 ; g2) and consider the vector z
T = [a, e(1; 1), . . . , e(1; 1)]. Compute χT = zT ? A. The
latter correspond to χT = e(gu
TA
1 ; g2) for (a not computed) u
T = [cd, 0, . . . , 0]. Now randomly choose
ψT = [ψ1, . . . , ψn] and compute ω
T = gψ
T
1 . Compute also the vector φ
T = e(ωT ; g2)/χ
T coefficient-wise.
The latter correspond to φT = e(gt
T
1 ; g2) for t
T = ψT − uTA. Finally, compute ζ = gψT ·x1 (indeed, then
µ = e(ζ; g2) = e(g
ψT ·x
1 ; g2) = η = e(g
uT ·y
1 ; g2)e(g
tT ·x
1 ; g2), that is η = (χ
T ? x)(φT ? x) is actually η =
(zT ? y)(φT ? x)). Now, if it is possible to break the scheme, then it is possible to compute ζ ′ that will pass
the verification for y′ as Ax, that is e(ζ ′; g2) = (zT ? y′)(φT ? x). Let h = uT y, d = tTx and h′ = uT y′. Then
e(ζ; g2) = e(g
h
1 ; g2)e(g
d
1 ; g2) and e(ζ
′; g2) = e(gh
′
1 ; g2)e(g
d
1 ; g2). But h
′−h = uT (y′− y) = cd(y′[1]− y[1]) = cd
by construction. Therefore ζ ′/ζ = gcd1 , as e is non-degenerate, and the co-CDH is solved.
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D Small fields
The protocol of Figure 1 is quite efficient. We have made experiments with randomly generated dense
matrices and vectors with the PBC library1 for the pairings and the FFLAS-FFPACK library2 for the exact
linear algebra over finite fields. For instance, it is shown in Table 3, that for a 8000×8000 matrix over a field
of size 256 bits, the protocol is highly practical: first, if the base field and the group orders are of similar
sizes, the verification phase is very efficient; second, the overhead of computing ζ for the server is quite
negligible and third, the key generation is dominated by the computation of one matrix-vector product.
Table 3: Verification of a 8000×8000 matrix-vector multiplication with different field sizes via the protocol
in Figure 1 on a single core @3.4GHz.
Field size |G| Security KeyGen Compute Verify
Total uTA overhead Total y = Ax overhead
256 256 128 13.65s 12.34s 1.22s 15.72s 13.46s 2.26s 0.03s
10 322 128 1.96s 0.05s 1.81s 0.22s 0.09s 0.13s 0.04s
Differently, if the base field is small, say machine word-size, then having to use cryptographic sizes for
the group orders can be penalizing for the Key Generation: multiplying a small field matrix A with a large
field vector uT is much slower than y = Ax with x and A small. First of all, the computations must be
compatible. For this, one possibility is to ask and verify instead for y = Ax over Z and then to let the
Verifier compute y mod p for himself. There, to reduce the overhead of computing uTA, one can instead
select the m values of the vector u as u` = αrisj with ` = id
√
me + j for α a randomly chosen large value
and ri, sj some randomly chosen small values. Indeed then u
TA can be computed by first performing (rsT )A
via O (√m) matrix-vector computations with s (or a √m×n√m matrix-vector multiplication) followed by
O (n√m) multiplications by r (or a n×√m matrix-vector multiplication) where sj and ri are small values.
Then it remains only to multiply a vector of small values by α. We have traded O (mn) operations with
large values for O (√mn√m+ n√m) operations with small values and O (n) with large values.
Now, in order for the values to remain correct over Z, the value of (uTA+ tT )x must not overflow. For
this, one must choose a group order larger than mnp4 (for (rsT )Ax). Now the security is not anymore half
the size of the group order but potentially half the size of the set from which tT is selected, that is at most
the group order size minus that of np (for tTx). To be conservative we even propose, as an estimated security
of the obtained protocol, to consider only half the size of α (that is the size of the group order minus that
of mnp4). In terms of efficiency, the improvement is shown in Table 1, last row. On the one hand, the key
generation is now dominant and can be amortized only after about 10 matrix-vector multiplications. On
the other hand, the verification time starts to be faster than the computation time. This is also shown in
Figure 6 where the equivalent of the last row in Table 3 is shown for different matrix dimensions.
E Proven publicly delegatable protocol with negligible crypto-
graphic operations
We first give the proof of Theorem 8, page 8, recalled hereafter, for the correctness, soundness and complexity
of the protocol in Figures 4 and 7. The flow of exchanges within our protocol is also illustrated in Figure 7.
Theorem 8. Let A ∈ Fm×np whose matrix-vector products costs µ(A) arithmetic operations. Protocol 4 is
sound under the co-CDH assumption. It is also perfectly complete and its number of performed operations
is bounded as follows:
Preparation Prover Verifier
Fp µ(A)+O (m+n) µ(A) O (m+n)
Gi O (m+n) O
(
m+n4/3
) O (√m+n2/3)
Pairings 0 0 O (√m+√n)
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Figure 6: Trustee-helped Verification of a dense matrix-vector product in a 10-bits finite field on a single
core @3.4GHz.
Proof. Completeness stems again directly from Equation (1).
For the complexity bounds, we fix b1b2 ≥ m and b1+b2 = Θ (
√
m) (usually, pairing operations are costlier
than group operations, therefore a good practice could be to take b1 < b2 and we, for instance, often have
used b2 = 100b1 with b1b2 ≈ m which gave us a speed-up by a factor of 5), c1c2 ≥ n and c1 + c2 = Θ (
√
n),
and finally d1 = O
(
m1/3
)
and d2 = O
(
m2/3
)
. For the Prover, we then have that y obtained in µ(A)
operations; ζ in O (n); s1, s2 and z computations are bounded by O (n+m) where C thus requires O
(
n4/3
)
operations. The cost for the preparation is O (m+ n) for U , T and $TV . ω requires µ(A) + 2m classical
operations and O (m) group operations. (gδ1)V
T
requires O (n) group operations while gτi1 , gηi1 , gρi2 , and gµi2 ,
require Θ (
√
m+
√
n) operations, more than for (gγ2 )
$T and (gδ1)
$TV . The complexity for the Verifier is
then dominated by O (n2/3) operations to check C, O (n) classical operations for Y · v3 and O (√n) pairing
operations.
Finally for the soundness, assume that there is an adversary A that breaks the soundness of our protocol
with non-negligible advantage  for a matrix A ∈ Fm×np . In the following we will prove how an adversary
B can use adversary A to break the co-CDH assumption with non-negligible advantage ′ ' . Let assume
that B was given a co-CDH sample (L = ga1 , R = gb2). First B simulates the soundness experiment to
adversary A in the following manner: when A calls the oracle OKeyGen, adversary B first chooses integers,
b1, b2, c1, c2, d1, and d2 such that m = b1b2 and n = b1b2 = d1d2. Then it generates random vectors
µ0 ∈ Fb1p , η0 ∈ Fb2p , ρ01 ∈ Fc1p , τ01 ∈ Fc2p , ρ02 ∈ Fc1p , τ02 ∈ Fc2p , $ ∈ Fd1p and a value r ∈ Fp. We let u0 be the
vector representation of µ0 ·ηT0 and t0 that of ρ01 · τT01+ρ02 · τT02. We also let v = −(ATu0+ t0) ∈ Fnp . Finally,
B forms ωT = Lr·vT ; gη1 = Lη0 , gµ2 = Rµ0 ; gτ11 = Lτ01 , gρ12 = Rρ01 ; gτ21 = Lτ02 , gρ22 = Rρ02 ; gδ1 = L, gγ2 = gr2;
gδV1 = L
V , (gr2)
$T = (gγ2 )
$T and (gδ1)
$T ∗V = (gγ1 )
$TV and outputs:
param = (m,n, b1, b2, c1, c2, d1, d2, p, e,G1,G2,GT , g1, g2, gT ).
EKf = {A,ωT , (gτ
T
1
1 ), (g
τT2
1 ), (g
ηT
1 ), (g
δ·V
1 )}
V Kf = {(gτ
T
1
1 ), (g
τT2
1 ), (g
ρ1
2 ), (g
ρ2
2 ), (g
ηT
1 ), (g
µ
2 ), (g
δ$T ·V
1 ), (g
γ$
2 ), g
γ
2 }.
Thanks to the randomness and the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption (DDH) in each group Gi, as
well as [6, Theorem 3] for ωT = (Lr)v
T
, these public values are indistinguishable from randomly generated
inputs. Further, we have ωT = garv
T
1 = g
ab(uT0 A+t
T
0 +v
T )+arvT
1 = g
abuT0 A+abt
T
0 +a(b+r)v
T
1 .
When adversary A calls the oracle OProbGen on input x, adversary B returns σx = x. Therefore, if y = Ax
and ζ = ωT ?x, then the verification will pass: indeed the first two checks will ensure that sT1 = g
τT1
1 ?X and
sT2 = g
τT2
1 ? X when the third check ensures that z
T = gη
T
1 ? Y . This shows that:
H =
(∏
e(z[i]; g
µ[i]
1 )
)
= e(g1; g2)
abuT0 y,
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Prover V erifierA∈Fm×np
b1, b2, c1, c2, d1, d2 with b1b2 =m, c1c2 = d1d2 =n,
b1+b2 =O
(
m
1
2
)
, c1+c2 =O
(
n
1
2
)
, d1 =O
(
n
1
3
)
, d2 =O
(
n
2
3
)
random µ ∈ Fb1p , η ∈ Fb2p , σ{1;2} ∈ Fc1p , τ{1;2} ∈ Fc2p , $ ∈ Fd1p
random γ ∈ Fp, δ ∈ Fp, v ∈ Fnp ' V ∈ Fd1×d2p
U = µ · ηT ∈ Fb1×b2p ' uT ∈ Fmp
T = σ1 · τT1 + σ2 · τT2 ∈ Fc1×c2p ' tT ∈ Fnp
ωT = gu
T ·A+tT+γδ·vT
1
publish A,ω, g
τT1
1 , g
σ1
2 , g
τT2
1 , g
σ2
2 , g
ηT
1 , g
µ
2
publish gδ1, g
γ
2 , (g
δ
1)
V T , (gγ2 )
$T , (gδ1)
$TV
x∈Fnp'Fc2×c1p 'Fd2×d1poo
y = Ax
ζ = ωT ? x =
n∏
j=1
ω
xj
j
sT1 = g
τT1
1 ? X and s
T
2 = g
τT2
1 ? X
zT = gη
T
1 ? Y
C = (gδ1)
V ? X
y, ζ, s1, s2, z, C // random v1 ∈ Fc1p , v2 ∈ Fc1p , v3 ∈ Fb1p , v4 ∈ Fd1p
sT1 ? v1
?
== g
τT1
1 ? (X · v1) and sT2 ? v2 ?== gτ
T
2
1 ? (X · v2)
D1 =
(∏
e(s1[i]; g
σ1[i]
2 )
)
and D2 =
(∏
e(s2[i]; g
σ2[i]
2 )
)
zT ? v3
?
== gη
T
1 ? (Y · v3)
H =
(∏
e(z[i]; g
µ[i]
2 )
)
ϑ = C ? v4,
∏
e(ϑ[i]; g
γ$[i]
2 )
?
== e(gδ$
TV
1 ? (X · v4); gγ2 )
e(ζ; g2)
?
== H ·D1 ·D2 · e(Trace(C); gγ2 )
Figure 7: Exchanges in the proven publicly delegatable protocol with negligible cryptographic operations of
Figure 4.
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and that:
Dj =
(∏
e(sj [i]; g
ρj [i]
2 )
)
for j = 1, 2.
Finally, the last check is that these two parts, as well as the last one, which is e(gδ1; g
γ
2 )
vT ·x = e(g1; g2)a(b+r)v
T ·x =
e(Trace(gδ·V X1 ); g
γ
2 ), are coherent with the definitions of ω and ζ above. Now, with a non-negligible prob-
ability , adversary A can pass the check for another y′ 6= y, by providing an adequate ζ ′. First, zT ,
sT1 , s
T
2 and C must be correct, as they are checked directly and independently by the Freivalds first four
checks. Second, we have that e(ζ ′; g2) = e(g1; g2)abu
T
0 y
′+abtT0 xe(gδ1; g
γ
2 )
vT ·x and therefore, we must also have
e(ζ(ζ ′)−1; g2) = e(g1; g2)abu
T
0 (y−y′). As u0 is a secret unknown to adversary A, for a random y′ the prob-
ability that uT0 (y − y′) = 0 is bounded by 1/|G1| and thus negligible. Thus adversary B can compute
c ≡ (uT0 (y′ − y))−1 mod |G1| and (ζ/ζ ′)c = gab1 . Therefore it breaks the co-CDH assumption with non-
negligible probability ′ ' . The only other possibility is that adversary A was able to recover uT0 . But that
would directly implies that it has an advantage in the co-CDH: gη1 = L
η0 , gµ2 = R
µ0 .
In Table 4, we present more timings for the comparison between our protocol and, to our knowledge and
according to Table 2, the best previously known from [4]. The associated speed-ups supports our claim of a
Prover efficient protocol with a gain of two orders of magnitude.
Table 4: Speed-up of our novel Protocol over a 256-bit finite field on a i7 @3.4GHz.
Size 100 200 500 1000 2000 3000 4000
[4] 2.77s 10.93s 67.93s 271.03s 1079.71s 2430.05s 4329.46s
Fig. 7 0.17s 0.34s 0.98s 2.26s 5.37s 9.16s 13.76s
Speed-up 17 32 69 120 201 265 315
Size 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000
[4] 6790.15s 9780.24s 13309.61s 17416.38s 22002.51s 27175.12s
Fig. 7 18.55s 24.03s 29.93s 37.00s 44.00s 51.97s
Speed-up 366 407 445 471 500 523
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